Key Findings

*British citizens in the EU after Brexit* reports on the responses of 1328 British citizens who currently live in an EU/EEA member state to the survey ‘Migration and Citizenship after Brexit’. This is a largely settled population reporting plans to stay put in the long-term, with evidence of multi-generation settlement and changes to legal status to support long-term residence in the country of residence.

Family life is as significant as work and retirement among the reasons British citizens living in the EU give for their past migration practices and future migration plans.

Brexit was reported as having had a significant impact on their plans for migration and settlement, while the COVID-19 pandemic had had a negligible effect on these.

Those who did not share the same residence status and/or nationality as their close family members highlighted that Brexit had introduced significant concerns about their future rights to movement as a family, both within the EU and for repatriation to the UK.

Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic had significantly changed the feelings towards the UK of those taking part in the research in a way that was unambiguously negative.

Brexit had led to a significant proportion of this population being ineligible for the right to vote anywhere, with the loss of their right to vote in the European Parliament and, in most cases, the local elections of member states sitting alongside the loss of their right to vote in the UK after living abroad for 15 years.
Table of Contents

British citizens living in the EU/EEA: a sociodemographic profile 2
  A largely settled population with plans to stay put 3
Family, work and retirement the biggest reasons for changing country of residence since 2016 4
  Family outweighs work and retirement in future migration plans 5
Brexit has had a significant impact on future migration plans 6
Putting down roots and building families in the European Union 7
  Brexit and family migration and settlement plans 8
Identities and belongings 9
  Brexit has significantly affected feelings towards the UK 10
  British AND European 10
  Negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on feelings towards the UK of British citizens in the EU 11
Political participation at home and abroad 12
Key findings and outstanding issues 13
Notes 14
About the authors 15
Methodology 15
About MIGZEN 16
British citizens in the EU/EEA: a sociodemographic profile

The demographic data from the survey shows that among this population, we managed to recruit adults in all age groups from 18+. We can also see that 54% of those taking part were assigned the female sex at birth. Most respondents identified as either female (50%), male (42%) or cisgender (4.5%), but other gender identities were also represented, including non-binary/third gender (0.6%) and transgender (0.4%). Respondents’ sexual orientation was prevalently heterosexual (87%), but a significant share identified as gay or lesbian (5.5%); bisexual (2.6%), or asexual (2.5%).

Figure 1: Current Country of Residence of British Citizens living in the EU/EEA

Most respondents identified as white (78%), and 18% either identified through their nationality and/or as European or altogether questioned the legitimacy and/or appropriateness of this question. A relatively low proportion of respondents identified as mixed ethnicity (2.22%), and even fewer as Asian or South Asian (0.77%), Black (0.19%), Arab/Middle Eastern (0.10%) or other ethnicities (0.29%).

Looking at the data on respondents’ highest level of education revealed that 69% had degree-level education or higher, while the occupational data revealed that 77% worked in professional or managerial roles. Educational level and occupation regularly stand in as indicators of class position in social science research, and understood in this way these unusually high percentages signal a predominantly middle-class population. However, what this does not reveal is the extent to which this might be a socially mobile population, those whose occupations and educational achievements led to our description of them as middle class, but who had working class backgrounds.
There is limited publicly available data against which to measure the representativeness of this sample. For this data, our point of reference is the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS), which estimated in 2018 that 66% of British residents in the EU (excluding Ireland) are of working age (15-64), while 26% are aged 65 and over, with the remaining 8% aged under 15.

While the age ranges we used in the survey are at odds with those used in the ONS reporting, the fact that 53% of our respondents were aged 19-59 seems approximately in line with these estimates.

A largely settled population with plans to stay put

As Figure 3 illustrates, at the time of the survey 59% of the respondents had been residing uninterruptedly in their country of residence for more than 5 years. We can also see a small number of respondents who had moved since the end of the Brexit transition period. This group of recent arrivals includes, inter alia, British citizens subject to domestic immigration controls in EU member states (because they are no longer EU citizens with rights to free movement nor covered by the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement), family members of EU citizens, and dual nationals.

When asked about their plans for future mobility, this trend towards permanence was further corroborated by the 78% of respondents who stressed that it was somewhat or extremely unlikely that they would change their country of residence in the next five years, and by the 73% who stressed that they planned to settle permanently in their current place of residence. Of those who indicated these long-term plans to stay put (n=845), this was also supported by hopes for securing a legal status commensurate with these ambitions, either as permanent residents (60%) or citizens (34%) of their country of residence.

Since June 2016, almost 2/3 of respondents (63.5%) had changed their legal status in their country of residence. This is unsurprising given the changes brought about by Brexit to the legal frameworks supporting the continued residence of British citizens living in the EU. In all member states, those who were lawfully resident there before 31 December 2020, either now hold a new status under the UK-EU
Withdrawal Agreement (declaratory states), or in constitutive states had to apply for a Withdrawal Agreement Residence Permit (WARP) to confirm their rights under the Withdrawal Agreement. For those who have arrived since then, their right to residence relies on possession of residence permits or visas in line with national or EU immigration laws.

For the 30% of respondents who had not changed their legal status in their country of residence, this might be because of a prior status granting them a right to reside unaffected by Brexit (for example, already having citizenship in their place of residence). However, it may also offer an early indicator that within this population there are some who may find themselves without legal residence status, with consequences in the future for their right to residence, and access to healthcare, welfare and work (among other services). A further 6% preferred not to say or did not know.

Looking in greater detail at Figure 4, it is clear that the majority of those changing their status had become WA permanent residents in their place of residence (62%), while a smaller proportion had become WA ordinary residents (23%)—and so will be in a position where they need to reapply for WA permanent residence when this status expires. A further 12% had become citizens.

This population includes a significant percentage of British citizens who hold dual or multiple nationalities, with 23% of those responding indicating that this was the case. Combined nationalities were overwhelmingly British plus the nationality of an EU Member State.

To our minds, taken together this broad sketch drawn from those responding to this survey paints a very different picture of the British citizen population living in the EU than is prominent in public and political imaginings, which tend to cast them as a population that has moved to the EU upon retirement and lives in predominantly British communities. This overlooks the extent to which British citizens currently living in the EU are not only of working age and below, but are also economically active and socially integrated in their countries of residence.

Family, work and retirement the biggest reasons for changing country of residence since 2016

The survey also documented that since June 2016, 38% (n = 497) had changed their country of residence. This indicates that the majority (62%) of those taking part in the survey had been resident long term in their country of residence.

We focus here on those who have changed their country of residence since 2016. The vast majority (89%, or n = 442) of those changing their country of residence had only done so once in the last 5 years.
Looking at the primary and secondary reasons people gave for having changed their country of residence since 2016 (Figure 5), it is notable that while retirement featured prominently, work remained similarly important. We particularly highlight the high number of responses that stressed the significance of family, partner or spouse to changes in their country of residence. This reveals a complex picture of the reasons for changing country of residence that reflects the broader context of an integrated labour market across the EU—and the significance of intra-EU mobility within this, including for British citizens—and the interpersonal dimensions of decisions about where to live and work. Brexit was also presented as a significant reason for making such a change. Apart from these prominent reasons, respondents gave a wide range of other reasons for having chosen to change their country of residence, including citizenship and migration law requirements and lifestyle.

Family outweighs work and retirement in future migration plans

Priorities significantly narrow when looking at the reasons given by respondents (Figure 6) for considering a change in their country of residence within the next 5 years. Among those who did not categorically exclude the possibility of doing so, family and/or partner/spouse stood out by far compared to any of the other factors, constituting the most important secondary (28%) as well as the most important primary (31%) reason. This was followed by work as a primary or secondary reason (20% and 14% respectively), and retirement (16% and 11% respectively). The significance of these reasons emerges yet more clearly when considering the high proportion of respondents who could not identify any primary (16%) or secondary reason (24%) why they would think about moving.

The predominance of work, family and retirement in both changes in residence and future migration plans reflects broader trends in migration between the UK and EU. While retirement is often over-stated in public and political understandings of British emigration, more overlooked have been both the significance of labour migration to the formation of a British citizen population in the EU and the role of intimate relations—including the formation and/or reunification of dual/multiple nationality families—in the migration and settlement trajectories of British citizens in the EU.
Looking at the places these British citizens might consider moving to shows that the UK is the most likely future destination (46%). The majority of other destinations considered were within the EU, with Spain (9%) and France (9%) the countries eliciting the highest number of responses.

**Brexit has had a significant impact on future migration plans**

When we asked respondents to reflect on whether their migration plans had been affected by Brexit, many reported that it had had a significant impact, with 27% indicating that it had affected these plans ‘a great deal’ and a further 14% stating ‘a lot’. As Figure 7 shows, this contrasts markedly with their responses to a question about the effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on their migration plans.

Open text responses to the survey (n=271) contained more detail about the ways in which Brexit has affected both past and present migration plans. For many, Brexit and the change of legal status firmed up plans to move to the EU from the UK as well as plans to stay put for longer periods of time. In the case of the latter, this was both to meet the requirements for legal residence (in the case of second homeowners) or, in the longer term, to apply for citizenship in the country of residence, and with it regain free movement rights across the EU. Many responses highlighted how Brexit had changed their rights, as well as what this meant for the way they had been leading their lives or had hoped to live their lives in the future.
Where does one start! Loss of rights like freedom of movement around the EU and to UK. Loss of capital due to weakening of € after June 2016. With a wife who is an EU citizen, had to decide whether to move to the relevant EU country or stay in UK. Family now cannot move to back to Britain. Loss of ability to use UK based banks. Uncertainty. (White male British citizen in Belgium, 60s)

Requirement of settled status, the cost of gaining citizenship in the UK for my spouse, the lack of familial support in the UK, the complications of trade and travel between the UK and the EU. (White female British citizen in Portugal, 30s)

My original plan (pre-2016) was to move to France on retirement, due in 2026. Brexit caused me to move sooner, in order to retain my European citizenship rights. The pandemic helped (indirectly) in that I got locked down in France in 2020, which enabled me to earn residence under the pre-Brexit rules. I had been talking to my employer about doing something similar before the pandemic broke. (White male British citizen in France, 60s)

I moved to France in 2020 in order to protect my right to live and work in France post-Brexit. My migration is 100% a result of Brexit and end of FOM for UK citizens. (White male American-British dual national in France, 40s)

Overall, responses here communicated a strong sense of the impacts of the removal of freedom of movement among those unable to move freely across the EU for work and those seeking to retire to an EU country in the future, as well as among those who previously had been able to live part-time in an EU member state (up to 180 days) and now found they were limited to 90 days. Those taking part told stories about how they experienced the removal of free movement as becoming more immobile, stuck in place in ways that they had not been previously and deep transformations in how they had been living their lives.

Putting down roots and building families in the European Union

We return here to looking in more depth at the patterns of settlement among the British citizens responding to the survey. There are several findings that stand out, among them, multi-generational settlement and British-European family formations. Slightly more than half the respondents (52%) lived in the same country as any of their close family members. This leaves a significant percentage who were likely to be individual migrants. Among those shared their country of residence (CoR) with a close family member, 78% said that they lived in the same CoR as their partner, with 35% of these respondents indicating that they also lived in the same country as their children. An additional 7% stressed that they lived in the same CoR as their children only. As Figure 8 shows, respondents shared the same CoR with several other family members as well.

We highlight this here because it further illustrates the significance of family not only to migration but also to settlement patterns. The high proportion of people living in the same country of residence as their children demonstrates multigenerational settlement.
When we look at legal status among family members, while 52% of respondents share the same citizenship or migration status as their close family members living in the country of residence, 11% shared it with only some of them, and 35% with none.

The significant proportion of people in mixed-status relationships draws attention to the prominence of dual (or multiple) nationality relationships for these British citizens. These differences are configured in many different ways, such as within (e.g., among partners) or across generations (e.g., parents and children), and within one or across multiple countries. They are also characterised by different levels of complexity and intertwining based on the relative position of the British citizen vis-a-vis their EU/EEA or non-EU/EEA family members, and their status in their country of residence.

**Brexit and family migration and settlement plans**

In the context of Brexit and the changes that this has brought, we asked those with mixed-status relationships whether they had concerns about this difference. Of the 297 responses, 33% said that this difference in status constituted a major issue of concern. A further 36% said this difference constituted a significant issue of concern.

Most respondents relayed concerns for the loss of their capacity to seamlessly move and settle as a family within the borders of the former EU28, encountering little to no bureaucratic hurdles. For many, the loss of this right to freedom of movement impacted their own and their children's work, career and educational present and future, engendering new tensions as well as pain for the ensuing internal inequalities:

- *My kids are second generation born abroad so cannot be British. As a result, they only have EU citizenship. Our two older kids stayed in the UK when we moved and now have permanent leave to remain. Our youngest has no rights in respect of the UK and we won’t be able to afford to send him to study there on international fees.* (White female British citizen living in Belgium less than 2 years; dual national; 50s)

- *My wife is a Russian citizen. Her residency and right to live and work depend upon my status under article 18 of the withdrawal agreement. The uncertainty delayed moving and even now, she fears a potential move to [another EU country] as her residency rights are totally dependent upon those of me.* (White male British citizen in Italy over 5 years; 50s)

Asked to reflect on whether this difference in status had affected their decisions to move on or stay put, 57% reported that it had not affected their decision. Nevertheless, this left 43% for whom this difference in status had affected their decision-making about whether to move or to stay—albeit to different degrees.

We highlight here that for those with non-British partners and spouses, an additional concern was about the challenges of moving (back) to the UK should they need or want to in the future, given that their partners and other family members right to return with them or join them would be subject to the
British citizens in the EU after Brexit

UK’s domestic immigration controls from 30 March 2022.³

My partner is (still) an EU citizen, and I am British. Since the Brexit referendum he has not wanted to live in the UK, and we moved together to the Netherlands in 2020 because of that. We have had to think carefully about where we can both live and work in future, now our rights in EU countries are different. (White female British citizen living in the Netherlands for less than a year; 30s)

The original plan was for my mother to come and live with me when [she] could no longer manage on her own. She is not dependent on me and I have siblings in the UK. That door is now effectively closed as the visa requirements will be too onerous. We’d even bought our home with accommodation for her and completed adaptation work to allow for reduced mobility. (British citizen living in France for over 5 years)

I have a house in England. I was going to retire back to the UK. The house is being sold and contracts should be exchanged this week. My wife is Dutch, we lived 15 years together in the UK before a job appeared for me in NL and we relocated in 2012. I do not think that my wife could even relocate back to the UK (despite joint ownership of a house, having lived there for 15 years, due 15+ years of UK OAP, fluent in English, 2 dual nationality kids, etc). (White male British citizen living in the Netherlands for over five years; 60s)

As these quotations make visible, for many British citizens who live or have lived in the EU/EEA, Brexit has brought borders into the space of intimate relations in ways they had not previously experienced.

Identities and belongings

One of the mainstays of a lot of research on how Brexit was experienced by British citizens living in the EU/EEA, EU/EEA citizens in the UK has been a concern about what this meant for identities and belongings. From the 2016 Referendum onwards, social science researchers have documented the unsettling impact of this political transformation and its implications for these populations.⁴

Conducted a year after the end of the Brexit transition period, the survey asked those participating to reflect on their emotional attachments to their country of origin, country of residence and to the European Union and the extent to which Brexit had intervened in their feelings towards each of these.
Brexit has significantly affected feelings towards the UK

The responses to the survey show that for Britons living in the EU, Brexit has had the most significant impact on their feelings towards the UK, with 80% responding that it had impacted a great deal or a lot.

Examining the open text responses reveals the predominantly negative impact reported by those responding that Brexit had had a significant impact on their feelings towards the UK.

- Deep deep shame. Embarrassed to be British, ashamed that I didn’t try hard enough, or appreciate my EU citizenship. (Female British citizen in Norway, 40s)
- Since Brexit I am disappointed in the UK. I am worried, and no longer feel like I have the same affinity for the country. It’s a shame because I love ‘home’ but the country feels so polarized. (White female British citizen in Denmark, 30s)
- I feel disconnected, like it’s a completely different country from how I left it. So much so I feel more connected with my second nationality (Irish) despite the fact I never grew up in Ireland. It’s embarrassing what’s happened in the UK and what continues to happen. It’s like watching a house on fire from afar. (White female British-Irish dual national in Austria, 30s)

These quotations highlight the prominence of feelings of shame, disconnection and disappointment within the responses. This is consistent with previous research into Brexit and its impacts on British citizens in the EU/EEA conducted from the 2016 Brexit referendum onwards, demonstrating the long-term significance of Brexit for how British citizens living in the EU/EEA relate to the UK.

British AND European

In contrast, respondents reported more varied impacts on their feelings toward their country of residence and the EU. Indeed, 35% responded that Brexit had not impacted at all on their feelings towards the EU, with 43% responding in the same manner vis-à-vis their feelings towards their country of residence.
In respect of the country of residence, 43% stated that Brexit had not changed their feelings, and in respect of the EU the impact of their feelings towards the EU largely fell into the lower end of the intensity scale. However, two stories that become clear through this data were strength of emotional attachment to the EU, which suggests that this population identifies strongly as European, and the significant changes brought about by Brexit that indicated strong feelings about the UK. Taken together, these signal a population that identifies as both British and European.

Figure 10 illustrates that respondents expressed a range of feelings towards their country of origin, country of residence and the EU. When we look at their strength of feelings towards each of these locations, there is a notable contrast between the 31% reporting that they felt very or extremely emotionally attached to their country of origin and the 75% reporting very or extreme emotional attachment to the EU, and the 59% expressing the same in relation to their country of residence.

Negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on feelings towards the UK of British citizens in the EU
As Figure 11 demonstrates, when asked about how the COVID-19 pandemic had impacted on their feelings about their country of origin, country of residence and the EU, the responses displayed a significantly different pattern. In contrast to the impact of Brexit, a smaller proportion of the population reported that COVID-19 had had a significant impact on their feelings towards the UK; 43% responded that it had impacted a great deal or a lot on these feelings, while it had significantly less impact on how they felt towards the EU or their country of residence.

Examining the open text responses reveals an almost exclusively negative impact among those reporting that the pandemic had had a significant impact on their feeling towards the UK.

*It was shambolic. Too late, too little, mixed messaging, lack of seriousness. So many deaths after what should have been a head start* (British citizen in Spain, 50s, white female)

*It’s a shit show. Utter incompetence. I believe democide sums it up.* (British citizen in Greece, 60s, male)

*I am embarrassed at the grab of vaccines and lack of worldwide care regarding getting vaccines to other countries. I am embarrassed at the ‘we are the best, biggest, greatest, first.’ nature of the reportage. I deplore the money-making and mates-contracts of goods and services. I am repelled by the us and them stance of government to populace. I am anxious of where the country will be left after it has been depleted and exhausted.* (British citizen in Belgium, 50s, white female)

What becomes clear through these responses is that their perceptions of the UK government’s approach to the pandemic negatively impacted on their feelings towards the UK.

**Political participation at home and abroad**

The story that emerges from the data collected on political participation among British citizens living in the EU/EEA is about disenfranchisement in the UK and abroad. Of those participating in the survey, 42% responded that they had no voting rights in their country of origin (UK). Current rules mean that British citizens who have lived outside the UK for fifteen years or more lose their rights to vote in general and local elections and referenda in the UK. The UK Government estimates that the removal of the 15 year rule would increase the numbers of British citizens living abroad eligible to vote from **0.9-1.1 million** to **3.2-3.4 million**. These estimates suggest that at present, the percentage of disenfranchised British citizens abroad is currently between 68-72% of the population, a figure that corresponds with our earlier observation of the high proportion of those who took part in the survey who had settled long-term outside the UK.

Turning to voting rights in their country of residence, 46% responded that they had no voting rights. Since Brexit and the removal of EU citizenship, British citizens in the EU/EEA no longer have the right to vote in European Parliamentary and local elections in cases where the franchise was previously contingent on EU citizenship.
What emerges from these two insights is a British population largely disenfranchised in both their country of origin and their country of residence. For those who still had the right to vote in the UK, 85% reported voting in the 2019 General Election. This is a considerably higher turnout than among the UK’s population as a whole (67.3%). Similarly, their participation in the Referendum (87%) was markedly higher than for the UK population (72.2%) as a whole.

This makes clear that British citizens living in the EU remained interested and engaged in UK politics. The data also shows that Brexit had significantly changed the political participation and engagement of many of those taking part; 51% reported that their engagement had changed since Brexit, with 77% of those people reporting an increase in their engagement.

Key findings and outstanding issues

*British citizens in the EU after Brexit* reports on the responses to the survey ‘Migration and Citizenship after Brexit’ by 1328 British citizens who currently live in an EU / EEA member state. Drawn from a large and geographically distributed sample of British citizens living in the EU/EEA, we list below our findings that offer insights into a range of issues including their migration trajectories; residential and nationality status in their country of residence; the impacts of Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic on their future migration plans; family life; political participation in the UK and within the EU; and understandings of citizenship, identity and belonging.

Firstly, the British residents in the EU/EEA who participated in this survey are a largely settled population who plan to stay in their country of residence long-term; many had put down roots and built families in the European Union, with evidence of multi-generational settlement and British-European family formations.

Secondly, family, work and retirement were the most prominent reasons given for changes in country of residence since 2016—moving from the UK to an EU/EEA member state, or moving within the EU/EEA. When considering plans for future migration, family outweighed both work and retirement as an explanation and Brexit has had a significant impact on any future plans, given the reduced opportunities for mobility from the UK to the EU and within the EU since Brexit. Among those in British-European families, where in consequence of Brexit people had different statuses and rights to migration and settlement, one pronounced concern was about what this would mean for future migration plans and in particular for a return to the UK with non-British family members.

Thirdly, Brexit and the pandemic had significantly impacted on their feelings towards the UK, in mostly negative ways. Feelings towards the UK, EU and country of residence reveal a strong sense of a population who identify as both British and European. However, political disenfranchisement in the UK and abroad was the prominent story about political participation for those taking part in the survey. Our conclusions on political participation signal that while the vote for life will be welcomed, more could be done to tailor the franchise so that the extensive population of British citizens living outside the UK might have better democratic representation.

Issues outstanding include the consequences for those who have, for a variety of reasons, not secured their residence status under withdrawal law, whose temporary status will lapse—and what this might mean for their related rights and entitlements, access to employment and healthcare and consequences for their wellbeing. There is also a question about who British citizens in the EU can turn to in the context of a reduction in formal monitoring and support mechanisms, and the winding down
of British in Europe, the largest coalition of grassroots organisations advocating for the rights of British citizens in the EU/EEA since 2016. Finally, British migration to EU member states has continued irrespective of Brexit. The removal of freedom of movement will likely impact on patterns of migration and settlement as these migrations adjust to the demands of domestic immigration controls in each member state.

Notes
1. For more information about the survey, consult our notes on methodology.
2. There are limitations in this demographic data collected through the survey. Approximately a quarter of the respondents (24%, or n=374) dropped out before reaching the first question (i.e., age) of this module, and a few more (n=13) dropped-out before completing the last module. We thus have full demographic information for 75% (n=1140) of the British citizens who live or have lived in the EU/EEA.
3. This is unless reasonable grounds for belated applications persist.
About the authors

**Michaela Benson** is Professor in Public Sociology at Lancaster University, and co-lead for the research project *Rebordering Britain and Britons after Brexit (MIGZEN)*. She previously led the ERSC-funded project *BrExpats: Freedom of movement, citizenship and Brexit in the lives of Britons resident in the EU* which uniquely examined the impact and consequences of the Brexit negotiations for British citizens living across the EU, and received the British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship 2020-21 for her research *Britain and its overseas citizens: from decolonisation to Brexit*.

**Elena Zambelli** is Senior Research Associate at Lancaster University. For her PhD (Gender Studies, SOAS), she explored women’s subjectivation processes in Italy across spaces of sexual consumption and sex work. As a postdoctoral researcher (VU Amsterdam), she investigated interracial couples’ experiences of racism and discrimination in Europe, as part of the ERC-funded EUROMIX project. In the past, she has worked in international development programmes in the MENA region.

**Catherine Ruth Craven** is a Research Fellow in the Institute for Research into International Migration and Superdiversity (IRiS) at the University of Birmingham. She completed her PhD at SOAS University of London on the global-local politics of governing diaspora populations. Prior to that, she was a researcher on the EU H2020 funded project MAGYC and has been a visiting scholar at the Free University of Berlin, George Washington University, and York University, Ontario.

Professor **Nando Sigona** is Chair of International Migration and Forced Displacement at the University of Birmingham and Director of the Institute for Research into International Migration and Superdiversity (IRiS). He is co-lead for the research project *Rebordering Britain and Britons after Brexit (MIGZEN)* and his research funding portfolio includes the ESRC-funded *EU families and Eurochildren in Brexiting Britain*, which examined how these families responded to and were impacted by Brexit. He is also Research Associate at the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford and Senior Research Associate at ODI.

Methodology

The online survey on which this report is based was the first stage of the research in this mixed-methods project. The survey was directed at: (a) British citizens or nationals who are currently living/have lived in an EU/EEA country (excluding UK); (b) EU/EEA citizens or nationals who are currently living/have lived in the UK, and (c) Foreign-born, non-British and non-EU/EEA citizens or nationals who are currently living / have lived in the UK. More specifically, the survey aimed to understand whether and how Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic have affected respondents’ perceptions, plans and decisions on whether to stay put, migrate, or repatriate, how these events have changed, if at all, attitudes towards the EU, country of residence and origin, understandings of citizenship, identity and belonging.

The survey, which was administered via Qualtrics, contained 96 questions, organised into 6 modules, exploring: Current residency and migration/legal status; Citizenship and Migration trajectories; Relationships; Identities and belongings; Social, political and community participation; Socio-demographic information

The survey was open for five weeks (13 December 2021 - 16 January 2022). In this time, we collected 2,024 unique and valid responses. Data was exported from Qualtrics, anonymized, and analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively, using STATA and NVivo software respectively.
About MIGZEN

Rebordering Britain and Britons after Brexit (MIGZEN) explores the long-term impacts of Brexit and Britain’s shifting position on the world stage on migration to and from the UK. It is funded the ESRC through the Governance after Brexit scheme [ES/V004530/1]. It is a collaborative research project involving academics at the Universities of Birmingham and Lancaster, and partners The 3 Million, British in Europe and Migrant Voice. It aims to produce new and timely knowledge on how the changing legal and political relationship between the UK and EU in consequence of Brexit shapes migration and migrant experience - including settlement, questions of identity, citizenship and belonging. It adopts a unique approach to understanding Britain’s migration story, that brings together emigration with immigration, and that considers British citizens, EU citizens and Third Country Nationals alongside one another.

Our partners

Find us

- @_migzen_
- @_migzen_
- https://www.facebook.com/brexit.migration.citizenship
- https://migzen.net

How to cite this report


This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.